Author: Rod Cobain • 5 min read

In the original piece, Mike Dwyer painted a vivid picture: Manufacturing Supply Chains Are No Longer Just Mechanical or Logistical Systems, they are deeply entwined digital ecosystems, where each ERP module, IoT-enabled actuator, and tier-2 supplier nodes can become an entry point for cyber threats. Logistics Matters Today, I want to push the conversation further: the open source software (OSS) layer now acts like a silent “sub-supplier” embedded within your tech stack, and like any hidden supply risk, it demands boardroom attention, not just the care of the development team. The risk of ignoring this is not just to your business but that of your customer and their suppliers.
Recasting Mike Dwyer: Resilience Is About More Than Hardware
The core message from Mike remains pivotal:
- Cyber risk is business risk, it must be integrated across operations, procurement, R&D and logistics. How many times does this need to be repeated?
- Legacy point solutions are no longer sufficient, resilience must be designed globally across tiers. This is a leadership situation.
- Next-generation supply chains rely on intelligence, visibility, and agility, but every “smart” layer you add is a new attack surface.
What often goes unsaid, and is less visible to many manufacturers, is how much of the “smarts” in these systems is built on open source software components. Every subsystem, from sensor drivers to data analytics modules, often leverages OSS libraries. Thus, the same supply chain logic Mike describes must apply internally: your software dependencies are now your internal “suppliers.”
Meterian’s Warning: OSS Is Not Free from Risk. It’s a Source of Escalation Regardless of the business Size or Sector
Escalation Through the OSS Layer: A Multi-Tier Threat Model
Let’s examine how OSS risk can escalate, step by step, through any business sector:
- Developer/Subsystem Level
A team integrates a third-party open source library (e.g. for analytics, messaging, or edge compute). Unknown to them, one of its transitive dependencies includes a known CVE.
→ That module becomes a foothold vulnerable to exploitation. - Application/Subsystem Aggregation
The vulnerable component is embedded in a subsystem (e.g. quality tracking, process control) that exposes APIs or networked endpoints. Attackers exploit the library flaw to gain code execution or escalate privileges.
→ What was a discreet bug becomes a path into a critical sub-system. - Platform / Middleware / Integration Layer
Multiple subsystems feed into central integration layers (e.g. MES, orchestration, data middleware). A malicious actor moved laterally from one compromised subsystem into the integration fabric.
→ The exploit travels across domains, bridging OT/IT boundaries. - Control Systems / OT / Physical Assets
From the integration layer, attackers may reach OT systems controlling PLCs, robotics, or sensors. Here lies real operational impact, production halts, manipulated outputs, or safety risks.
→ The breach translates into physical damage or downtime. - Supply Chain / Partner Ecosystem
If that platform is shared, or upstream/downstream partners rely on shared components, the exploit can spread further. A single OSS vulnerability could cascade throughout the partner network.
→ The domain of the breach finally becomes systemic, affecting multiple actors.
At each layer, the “supplier” is the embedded code you didn’t write, and if you haven’t been continuously verifying its integrity, the risk is already live.
Practical Steps: Embedding OSS Governance into Your Resilience Strategy
To fuse Mike Dwyer’s vision and Meterian’s warnings into actionable posture, here are recommendations:
| Focus | Actions |
| Treat OSS like any other supplier | Maintain an SBOM (software bill of materials) for all systems. Demand “security assurances” (e.g. scans, patches) from internal and third-party teams. |
| Integrate continuous SCA / vulnerability scanning | Embed tools like Meterian (or similar) into CI/CD pipelines such that builds with failing security scores are automatically flagged or blocked. |
| Prioritize remediation, not just detection | Use auto-remediation where possible, or triage by threat score, to avoid alert fatigue and ensure action. Meterian helps with guided upgrade paths. |
| Cross-functional awareness & training | Empower developers, ops, procurement, and leadership with visibility into OSS risk, and grant them the agency to act. |
| Threat modelling spanning software supply chain | Extend your existing supply chain risk models to include internal “supplier layers” (OSS, SDKs) as nodes in your attack graphs. |
| Incident playbooks that assume internal code risk | In response planning, simulate OSS vulnerability scenarios, not just network intrusion, because in many modern attacks, the initial vector is a library exploit. |
Final Thought: Resilience Demands Depth, Not Just Perimeter
Mike Dwyer’s assertion remains apt: supply chain security is business security. But the conversation must now extend inward: the OSS layer, once viewed as a cost-saver or innovation enabler, is a core battleground. Its risks escalate upward. A vulnerability at the bottom can ripple all the way to the executive level, halting production lines or worse.
It’s time to shift from reactive patching to anticipatory governance. Treat code like any other critical supplier, inspect it, test it, govern it, and don’t let your next downtime be the moment you realize the invisible layer was your greatest weakness. Are you aware that the UK Cyber Framework is in the spotlight and is seen as the standard to follow?
Stop ignoring the silent supplier. It’s time to manage your Open Source Risk in the modern supply chain and manufacturing tech stack.

